How do formal and informal constraints shape the opportunity structures faced by executives that are willing to undertake military interventions?
“Our” Fabrizio Coticchia and Francesco N. Moro aimed to answer this question with a paper that is just published online by “International Relations” (gated). The title of the manuscript is: “Peaceful legislatures? Parliaments and military interventions after the Cold War: Insights from Germany and Italy”. Here below the abstract.
The article contributes to the growing debate on parliamentary war powers and shows how parliaments matter in shaping both force deployment and force employment. Through original analysis of the Italian and German decision-making on military interventions after the Cold War, the article illustrates how formal and informal constraints shape the opportunity structures faced by executives that are willing to undertake military interventions. Revisiting, and building on, the great deal of research recently emerged on institutional constraints to the use of force, the article details the types of costs – namely, transaction and audience costs – linked to involvement of legislatives in the decision-making and provides empirical support for theories based on parliamentary war powers, adding new dimensions of analysis.