Top 5 by Venus in Arms – week 76

With or Without you? This week we start our Top5 by quoting Bono Vox thanks to the article by Ulrich Kühn on the controversial relationship between NATO and Germany.

From Germany to Italy: The U.S. State Department has approved a longstanding request from Italy to arm its two MQ-9 Reaper drones with Hellfire missiles, laser-guided bombs and other munitions. It is with noticing that Italy would be only the second country to be approved to buy armed drones after Britain, which has been using them since 2007
Additional details here

We have read a lot of criticism towards the Obama’s foreign policy in recent weeks. Here you’ll find a different (and more optimistic) point of view.

And here you find a (rare) positive analysis of the EU (and its the accomplishments). According to Dan Drezner: the European Union is known for two signal accomplishments: ending any chance of another Franco-German war, and bringing Eastern Europe in from the cold […] The successful integration of Eastern Europe was a political and security necessity for the European Union after 1989. And anyone who tells you differently does not understand why the European Union is important.

Finally,  much more controversial issue: craft brewers, pale ale and IPAs.

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La riforma dell’Intelligence in Italia: alcune riflessioni.

Guest post di Alfonso Montagnese*

Quale percorso di trasformazione ha compiuto l’intelligence italiana a seguito della riforma introdotta dalla L. 124/2007? In che misura la riforma è stata implementata e quali sono le principali novità in campo organizzativo e funzionale rispetto al modello precedente? Ho provato a dare una risposta a queste ed altre domande in un breve saggio, dal titolo “La modernizzazione dell’intelligence italiana a seguito della riforma”, pubblicato sulla Rassegna dell’Arma dei Carabinieri. L’articolo trae spunto da un documento più articolato, presentato in occasione del Convegno organizzato dalla Società Italiana di Scienza Politica (SISP), tenutosi a Perugia dall’11 al 13 settembre 2014 e per il quale Venus (nella persona di Francesco N. Moro) ha svolto il compito di discussant.

Rispetto al modello organizzativo disegnato dalla legge 801/77, l’intelligence nazionale ha percorso un rapido e profondo processo di cambiamento, che, a distanza di circa sette anni dall’entrata in vigore della legge di riforma, appare in fase conclusiva.

La legge 124/07 rafforza, in modo molto equilibrato, i principali attori istituzionali coinvolti, sia sul piano decisionale sia su quello operativo, negli affari di intelligence e di sicurezza nazionale. La rinvigorita dotazione di poteri, capacità e strumenti ha interessato in primo luogo l’Esecutivo, che – con la forte centralizzazione della linea di comando – trova nella figura del Presidente del Consiglio il vertice assoluto dell’infrastruttura istituzionale deputata alla sicurezza nazionale.

Alla definizione del processo decisionale di vertice contribuiscono attivamente anche i Ministri maggiormente coinvolti nella tutela degli interessi strategici del Paese. Il massimo momento di sintesi e di integrazione è costituito dal CISR, organismo interministeriale che, con la sua ‘attivazione permanente’ a seguito dell’istituzione del CISR ‘tecnico’, si è configurato quale vero e proprio Consiglio per la sicurezza nazionale, elevando conseguentemente la qualità della pianificazione in materia di intelligence e la capacità prospettica delle autorità di Governo.

Il Presidente del Consiglio è stato affiancato da due nuovi organi: l’Autorità Delegata e il DIS. La loro funzione primaria è quella di porre rimedio al lamentato distacco tra i poteri di direzione politico-strategica, la responsabilità amministrativa e la conduzione quotidiana della materia relativa alla politica di informazione per la sicurezza. Entrambi gli attori svolgono una funzione di raccordo: il primo essenzialmente tra gli apparati di intelligence ed il Premier; il secondo opera come centro di coordinamento info-operativo tra le Agenzie, diventando l’anello di congiunzione tra il livello politico-strategico e quello operativo.

Al significativo potenziamento del potere Esecutivo è seguito un bilanciato irrobustimento dei meccanismi di controllo parlamentare. Il COPASIR è stato dotato di poteri particolarmente incisivi, che consentono un’efficace attività di vigilanza e controllo sull’operato dell’intelligence nazionale.

Anche sul piano operativo si registra un potenziamento delle strutture dedicate all’attività di intelligence. Le missioni istituzionali delle Agenzie sono oggi caratterizzate da un’area perimetrale molto vasta, sensibilmente ampliata rispetto a quella dei Servizi preesistenti. I nuovi, e più numerosi, interessi posti ‘sotto la tutela’ delle Agenzie hanno richiesto (e continueranno a farlo con più vigore in futuro) competenze adeguate e altamente specializzate, soprattutto in campi ‘lontani’, fino a meno di un decennio fa, dalle capacità tradizionalmente in possesso dell’intelligence.

L’intelligence nazionale ha compiuto, inoltre, un passo decisivo sul piano della trasparenza, dotandosi di un potente e sofisticato arsenale comunicativo, indirizzato a mitigare la diffidenza che i cittadini e l’opinione pubblica nutrono storicamente nei confronti degli organismi di informazione. In netta ed evidente rottura con il passato, i Servizi hanno iniziato a comunicare con l’esterno, con i limiti e le difficoltà intrinseche alla natura ed ai compiti stessi di tali particolari amministrazioni pubbliche.

Nel suo complesso, oggi, l’intelligence italiana si presenta molto ben strutturata e con una fisionomia aderente alle specificità del Paese, della fase storica contemporanea e dell’attuale quadro geo-strategico.

* Alfonso Montagnese è Maggiore dell’Arma dei Carabinieri e presta servizio presso il NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence di Vicenza. Collabora con l’Istituto Italiano di Studi Strategici “N. Machiavelli” ed è stato Direttore di Ricerca presso il Ce.Mi.S.S. dello Stato Maggiore della Difesa nel 2010 e nel 2012.

 

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ViA at ISA 2016: German and Italian defense, Mafia killings, and Renzi’s foreign policy

The International Studies Association has just released the preliminary programme for its (57th) annual convention. This year the conference will be held in Atlanta, from March 16-19 2016.

Here you can find all the info on the (huge) conference.

The title of the annual convention is “Exploring Peace“. As stated in the official website:  “Traditional international studies have put a premium on war, militarized conflict, and other violence as primary phenomena for investigation. In contrast, “peace” is often defined as the absence of militarized and violent conflict, an afterthought or residual category without a distinct theoretical explanation. Yet, such a characterization lumps many disparate kinds of events and relationships together. Economic sanctions are sometimes placed in the same “non-war” category as cultural exchanges […] The focus on mitigating conflict and violence has led scholars to downplay or ignore other values such as human rights, justice, and equity that are part of many conceptions of peace. In addition, such a concentration leads away from interactions that increasingly characterize international affairs, including trade cooperation, integration, and peace building…“.

Also this year Venus in Arms will be at the ISA, presenting three papers on different issues (and surely going to support the Atlanta Hawks at the Philips Arena) . Here below the abstracts of the paper we will present there.

“Divergent paths: Understanding post-Cold War Italian and German defense policy”

F.Coticchia and F.N. Moro

Italian and German defense policy during the Cold War shared several features, from the legacies of WWII defeat, to pacifism as a key in strategic narratives, limited military expenditures and non-use of armed force in international arena. Just after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, however, Italy provided its military contribution to “Desert Storm”, while Germany refused to deploy armed forces in Iraq. Since the end of the bipolar era, the Italian troops have been engaged in operations abroad and several defense reforms (suspension of conscription, jointness of the Chiefs of staff, etc.) have been approved. On the contrary, the first German combat operation occurred in 1999, and “military restraint” has been never abandoned. Moreover, territorial defense remained at the core of the strategic approach until the mid of the 2000s while the professional model was only recently adopted. Therefore, despite similar historical, institutional, and social premises post-bipolar outcomes have been divergent. What are the explaining factors of such different pace and timing of military transformation in the cases of Italian and German defense? Through primary and secondary sources, the paper focuses on prestige and parliamentary control that together with timing/sequencing played a crucial role in shaping the two outcomes.

“Transferring violence? Mafia killings in non-traditional areas: Evidence from Italy”

F.N. Moro and S. Sberna

Violence is a key tool used by organized crime to assert its control over territory and business. Since organized crime grew increasingly mobile and moved away from traditional areas of entrenchment, several popular analyses of mafias argue that violence is bound to spread to new areas of migration. In this paper, we argue that this view overlooks two important elements. First, criminal organizations acting in non-traditional areas face a structure of constraints and opportunities that does not favor the adoption of violence as a successful organizational strategy. Second, even when violent means are adopted they might be the result of conflicts that have their roots in the territories of origin of criminal groups. We provide empirical support to these statements trough quantitative analysis of violence perpetrated by mafia groups in Italy in the period between 1983 and 2008, analyzing the link between violence in the South (where these groups have established for over a century) and areas of recent expansion in the Northern part of the country. Also, we shed light on the mechanisms underpinning violence through micro narratives about specific episodes of violence

“Explaining Renzi’s Foreign Policy: The International Effects of Domestic Reforms”

F.Coticchia and J.W. Davidson

Since becoming Italy’s Prime Minister in February 2014 Matteo Renzi has attracted a lot of attention for his domestic political reforms. Journalists and scholars have focused far less attention on Renzi’s foreign policy, however. This lack of attention is striking given some of the Renzi government’s actions on the international stage. For example, Italy has refused to participate in air strikes against ISIS in Iraq and has favored accommodation with Russia over the Ukraine crisis.Based on primary (interviews, official documents) and secondary sources, this paper will attempt to explain the Renzi government’s foreign policy. First, because Renzi is focused on domestic reform, foreign policy is an afterthought. Renzi’s government has avoided costly policies (e.g., air strikes, purchasing new F-35 fighter, etc.) because they would undercut his economic plans. Second, because Renzi’s domestic reforms anger many on the left, he has chosen a foreign policy that appeals to–or at least does not create further problems with–the left (e.g., vocally asking for anti-austerity measures in the EU during the semester of Italian presidency). Finally, Renzi lacks foreign policy experience and has chosen low profile ministers who are not political competitors.

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The SISP XXIX Annual Conference

A brief post to remind the SISP (Italian Political Science Association) Annual Conference. The SISP meeting will be held in Arcavata di Rende (Cosenza) and it will start on Thursday 10th. the conference end date is Saturday 12th.

The conference is organized by the Department of Political and Social Science of the University of Calabria.

Here you’ll find info on the programme. Here on sections.

As stated bt the official website: The SISP Annual Conference offers the opportunity to explore and discuss core issues, new theoretical and methodological perspectives and recent research results in political science.The programme includes a plenary event, the Assembly of SISP members and numerous panels, divided in thematic sections, in which participants present and discuss recent research and analyses of high scientific impact and visibility.

All information on transport, accommodation, maps, and more are available on the dedicated website (here)

Here you’ll find the abstracts of the papers that will be presented at the IR section. At a first glance, a lot of interesting studies.

Unfortunately this year Venus won’t be at the Sisp. We will surely miss the conference (especially the “after-dinner” where we usually play the role of chair…)

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ViA 2015: La trasformazione militare italiana (e molto altro)

Terminata la pausa estiva, Venus in Arms è di nuovo pronto a rituffarsi sui temi della difesa e della sicurezza (e molto altro). In questo breve post di inizio Settembre illustreremo brevemente gli argomenti che saranno al centro della nostra attenzione nei prossimi mesi, nei quali cercheremo sempre di collegare analisi e studi “accademici” a riflessioni legate al dibattito corrente.

Primo aspetto al centro del nostro lavoro sarà la trasformazione militare italiana, ovvero l’argomento del nostro ultimo libro. Il volume analizza il processo di cambiamento delle forze armate italiane nel nuovo secolo, attraverso una prospettiva comparata (Francia e Gran Bretagna). L’analisi illustra l’interazione tra alcune dimensioni della trasformazione (budget, impiego sul campo, dottrina) e la loro influenza sul percorso di cambiamento e adattamento avvenuto negli ultimi anni nella Difesa italiana. Attraverso interviste, documenti ufficiali e fonti secondarie sono state esaminate in dettaglio le operazioni in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libano e Libia.

Una particolare attenzione è stata dedicata alla dimensione istituzionale del cambiamento. In linea con quest’ultimo aspetto, in futuro ci focalizzeremo sulla dimensione dell’apprendimento, attraverso survey e questionari.

Nelle prossime settimane organizzeremo alcuni seminari di presentazione del libro, che riporteremo per tempo sul blog. Un po’ di pubblicità non fa mai male, naturalmente.

Un altro aspetto che continuerà ad occupare costantemente le pagine di Venus sarà la Difesa italiana, soprattutto alla luce della pubblicazione dell’ultimo Libro Bianco e della riforme ad esso collegate. Stiamo lavorando proprio sull’ultimo documento strategico e a breve saranno qui riportati i risultati delle nostre analisi.

In chiave comparata ci dedicheremo poi al rapporto tra l’evoluzione della Difesa italiana e quella tedesca avvenuta nell’era post-bipolare. Abbiamo già passato un po’ di tempo di Germania per interviste e analisi. Quindi aspettatevi un bel po’ di materiale da leggere e discutere (non in tedesco, tranquilli).

Una parte consistente del nostro lavoro sarà poi dedicata ai temi della political violence, del ruolo della criminalità organizzata (nazionale e transnazionale), dei conflitti contemporanei.

Al tema dei foreign fighters saranno dedicati alcuni post, i quali riporteranno i risultati di alcuni analisi che abbiamo condotto di recente in merito al caso dell’ISIL.

Non ci dimenticheremo del controverso tema degli F-35, cercando però di spostare la discussione da una prospettiva budget-driven a qualcosa di più articolato, come fatto in passato.

La sicurezza europea, scossa dalle crisi interne e regionali e dal dramma immane dei profughi, non potrà che essere esaminata in dettaglio, così come la trasformazione della NATO.

Infine, i guest-post cercheranno di ampliare l’orizzonte interdisciplinare di ViA, da analisi tradizionali di Relazioni Internazionali agli studi di intelligence fino ai “nuovi” metodi di insegnamento in materia di IR, sicurezza e scienza politica. Ogni contributo alla discussione è ben accetto ovviamente.

Sarete sempre tenuti al corrente dei principali appuntamenti con conferenze e seminari (in più qualche dettaglio sulle trasferte che faremo in Europa League).

Insomma, molta carne al fuoco. Senza dimenticarci l’appuntamento settimanale con la nostra Top-5, che raccoglie i migliori “5 pezzi facili” che provengono da blog, riviste, giornali di tutto il mondo. La dimensione “pop” del sito non verrà trascurata, soprattutto nella spasmodica attesa del nuovo capitolo di Star Wars.

Stay tuned

 

 

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The Privatization of Italian Vessel Protection – Guest Post

by Eugenio Cusumano*

Italian maritime security policies have recently undergone major transformations. As announced by the Minister of Defence Pinotti before the Parliament last April, the detachment of Italian Navy personnel onboard Italian-flagged vessels crossing pirate-ridden waters has now been suspended. Consequently, the only option now available to Italian vessels transiting offshore the Horn of Africa now consists in the hiring of Private Security Companies (PSCs).

The penetration of the private sector into Italian maritime security was already envisaged by law 130/2011, which established a dual approach to vessel protection. Until last spring, however, the use of PSCs remained to a large degree a residual measure. Armed contractors could to only if VPDs are not available, and ship owners asking for the authorization to embark armed contractors needed to include written proof that a previous request for VPD personnel had been rejected by the Italian Navy due to the unavailability of military teams during that period. Moreover, the use of PSCs was de facto impossible before October 2013 because of an incomplete legal framework, which still required additional provisions on regulating the use, type, quantity and storage of weapons and clarifying the relationship between the PCASP and the Ship Master.

Due to these limitations, between 2012 and the autumn of 2015, the large majority of vessel protective missions were conducted by the Italian military. Italian Vessel Protection Detachments, consisting of teams of 6 to 9 personnel from the Italian Navy Infantry Fusiliers Brigade San Marco, conducted over 300 escorting missions, as opposed to the around 50 transits protected by PSCs.

As the use of VPDs has now been suspended, however, the use of armed guards for the protection of Italian-flagged shipped is set to increase. As of June 2015, PSCs have already conducted between 120 and 150 escorting missions.

Academic research has yet to unravel the fully unravel the drivers and implications of this policy change. While the minister explained the choice to refrain from using VPDs based on the decreased likelihood of piracy attacks and the full establishment of the norms allowing for a safe use of PSCs, other factors may have also played a role. The shifting priorities of the Italian Navy – now focused on the Mediterranean – and the problematic implications of detaching military personnel onboard merchant vessels – epitomized by the ongoing detention of two Italian Navy ‘marò’ in India – may be especially important to fully explain the decision.  As acknowledged by the Italian Senate Defence Committee, the use of private contractors may – due to their commercial nature – reduce diplomatic complications in case of incidents.  The effectiveness and appropriateness of using armed private security contractors both on land and at sea, however, has frequently been criticized by academics and journalists alike. Hence, more research is needed as to whether and to what extent PSCs offer a viable solution to the need for protecting Italian merchant vessels from pirate attacks. The article ‘Contractors as a Second Best Option: The Italian Hybrid Approach to Maritime Security’, co-authored with Stefano Ruzza, only provides a tentative starting point. 

* Eugenio Cusumano is Lecturer in International Relations in the Institute of History of Leiden University. More info here.

 

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Our book…

We are pleased to announce that we’ve just received the first copies of our book: “The Transformation of Italian Armed Forces in Comparative Perspective. Adapt, Improvise, Overcome?“, F. Coticchia and F.N. Moro, Ashgate, 2015.

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Here you’ll find the full contents list.

Here the first reviews.

We consider the manuscript as the ViA’s book. The blog will provide you further details on our research on military transformation in Europe. First of all, here you can download the introduction.

Let us know what do you think about…

 

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Book Talk: Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War

Today, 30 June 2015 at 3.30 pm, the NATO HQ (Luns Auditorium, Brussels) will host the presentation of the book: “Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War. Winning domestic support for the Afghan War“, edited by Beatrice de Graaf, George Dimitriu and Jens Ringsmose. The editors and three authors will illustrate the volume (unfortunately we have not been able to attend).

Here a description of the event.

The Former NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who wrote the preface, will introduce the event. 

Admiral James Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander at NATO 2009-13 and Dean of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, has defined the volume as a must-read to understand 21st century conflict“. 

As stated in a previous post, the manuscript aims at providing a  comprehensive analysis on strategic narratives, adopting a comparative perspective to examine the case of the military operation in Afghanistan. The case of Italy has been investigated by Venus in Arms‘s Fabrizio Coticchia and Carolina De Simone, in the chapter: “The winter of our consent? Framing Italy’s ‘peace mission’ in Afghanistan”.

Here will find more details on the book.

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Effective strategic narratives? Italian public opinion and military operations in Iraq, Libya, and Lebanon

Oddly enough, in the new Italian White Paper there are no references to the concept of strategic narratives. On the contrary, many official documents and statements by decision makers have recently emphasized the role played by strategic narratives to enhance the perceived legitimacy of military operations.

Venus in Arms has already addressed the concept of “strategic narratives”, defined by Freedman as: “compelling storylines which can explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn”

Today, we are pleased to present the new paper by Fabrizio Coticchia: “Effective strategic narratives? Italian public opinion and military operations in Iraq, Libya, and Lebanon” (here, gated). The paper has been published in the first issue of the new Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza PoliticaIPSR/RISP (now published by Cambridge University Press) provides three fully English-language issues per year. Here additional info on the Journal.

Here below the abstract of the paper:

Public attitudes are greatly shaped by the cohesiveness of the strategic narratives crafted by policy-makers in framing the national involvement in war. The literature has recently devoted growing attention toward the features that define successful strategic narratives, such as a consistent set of objectives, convincing cause–effect chains, as well as credible promises of success. This paper provides an original framework for ‘effective strategic narratives’ for the case of Italy. The military operations undertaken by Italian armed forces in Iraq, Lebanon, and Libya represent the cases through which the framework is assessed. Drawing on content and discourse analysis of political debates and data provided by public opinion surveys, this paper explores the nature of the strategic narratives and their effectiveness.

The author has already addressed the issue of narratives, public opinion and Italian military operations, locking at the case of Afghanistan (here)

The current paper presents two main implications.

First, strategic narratives should not be realistic, but rather compelling. A certain ambiguity of the storyline could be sometimes inevitable due to the gap between long-established values (such as peace or humanitarianism, which are very difficult to modify) and a risky military environment, where those beliefs may appears as extraneous. In these cases, an integrated communication strategy, aimed at preparing the public opinion and avoiding counter-productive rosy pictures, could be crucial to avoid a collapse of approval towards the intervention.

Second, as already tested by literature, casualty aversion per se does not determine the fall of public support. However, mounting insecurity on the ground requires greater flexibility of the narrative to adapt and transform. In this case, a negative narrative dominance (i.e., a more persuasive counter-narrative) could play a fundamental role in hindering the plot’s effectiveness.

ViA will provide additional posts in the near future regarding strategic narratives and other security issues (e.g., the F35). Stay tuned.

 

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Organized crime and “political” violence: A report from MPSA 2015 and a focus on Italian mafias

Midwest Political Science Annual Conference last week in Chicago. Good place to keep updated – and try to contribute on – recent advancements in the discipline. Few strands of literature have been enjoying a blossoming in the past years as conflict studies did. Evolving political realities – lot of attention was devoted to “Afghanistan and Iraq-like wars” – and progresses in research design and methods – with a strong push coming from quantitative studies blended in making the field so rich. Within this growing body of studies, a relevant place has been occupied by research looking at forms of violence and agents, such as organized crime, which have often escaped classical analyses of “political” violence.  Or at least those following Schmitt’s classical distinction between political and criminal aims contained in the famous Theory of the Partisan.

Thus, the panel on “Political Violence and Crime” at MPSA constituted an interesting opportunity to discuss current research on the theme (I think the late Charles Tilly, who was always keen in relating organized crime and political phenomena, would have been happy about it). Five very interesting pieces of work were presented. Harvard’s Bradley Holland presented a paper on ethnic violence linked to drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) in Southern California. Guillermo Trejo and Sandra Ley (Notre Dame) showed the link between the structures of political arenas and DTOs’ killings of politicians in Mexico. University of Wisconsin’s Nicholas Barnes presented his extensive fieldwork on gang governance in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas, and Wolfgang Muno (University of Mainz) laid out an interpretative framework to analyse “bad informal institutions”.

And then (highly likely that it is not the best piece, but for sure the dearest to Venus), Francesco (Moro) and Salvatore Sberna had a piece on violence in non-traditional areas – that is in the regions were mafia consortia did not have their roots – in Italy. The problem is a central one, given that organized crime and mafias are increasingly mobile and that violence perpetrated by these groups has been making the news on both sides of the Atlantic. Across the Ocean, there has been a lot of discussion over the effect of Mexican drug cartels’ presence in large US cities. Italian mafias as well sparked debate, both in Italy – where presence in the Northern regions of the country has been expanding for decades – and abroad – where violence erupted in “surprising” locations (such as Duisburg in Germany, where a massacre took place in 2007).

The paper addressed, both theoretically and empirically, two major puzzles. First, notwithstanding expansion in Northern regions, the number of mafia homicides in these areas is overall much lower than in Southern regions where mafias have their strongholds. Second, although limited, violence (measured by mafia homicides) in Northern regions present notable diversities: some provinces in some years are clearly more violent than others. How, then, can this diversity be explained?

Three main findings emerge:

  • Violence in non-traditional areas is more limited as groups do not find the same environmental conditions of territories of origin. First, the balance of forces versus law enforcement is penalizing. Second, business in new markets is less confined to the provision of “private protection” and more based on the attempt to penetrate legal markets, where resort to violence is less needed. Becoming legitimate, by way, has been the attempt of most criminals in pop-culture, from Michael Corleone to Lemond Bishop (a reference for the Chicagoans). This has always Third, and as a consequence, mafia groups in new areas often choose to “outsource” the use of violent means to other agents (often, coming from parent groups in areas of origin).
  • When violence happens in new territories, it is often the result of “transfers” (spillovers) from mafia violence in the old ones. That is, if a conflict erupts in a Sicilian province, it will likely affect violence in a Northern province where the Sicilian groups involved in the conflict previously migrated.
  • Violence transfers are affected by local conditions as well. Spillovers, in other words, happen in the provinces where the mafia groups’ presence has been more consolidated (over time) and where they actually have more capabilities/resources (which is signalled by the absence of other mafia consortia in the same area).

Work is under way in these directions. Stay tuned for details!

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